Supreme Court Reiterates Plaintiff Must Personally Prove Readiness and Willingness in Specific Performance Suits

In Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar & Ors. (2024 Latest Caselaw 357 SC), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must personally enter the witness box to establish continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The Court also held that a power of attorney holder cannot testify on matters requiring the plaintiff's personal knowledge and upheld the dismissal of the suit. 

The appellant entered into an agreement to purchase agricultural land from one of the co-owners, who claimed to act as the power of attorney holder of the remaining co-owners. The agreement was extended several times, and additional payments were made towards the sale consideration. Before the sale deed could be executed, the property was sold to third parties. The appellant issued a legal notice demanding execution of the sale deed and later filed a suit for specific performance. The Trial Court decreed the suit. However, the High Court reversed the decree, holding that the agreement was not binding on all co-owners and that the plaintiff had failed to personally prove his readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The plaintiff challenged the High Court's decision before the Supreme Court. 

Whether a suit for specific performance can succeed when the agreement is not executed by all co-owners and when the plaintiff does not personally depose to establish readiness and willingness to perform the contract. 

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment and observed that: •The agreement to sell was executed only by one co-owner, and no valid power of attorney authorising him to act on behalf of the remaining co-owners was produced or proved. •An agreement executed by only some co-owners cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced against the interests of non-signatory co-owners. •In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must personally establish continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract as required under the Specific Relief Act. •A power of attorney holder may depose only regarding acts personally performed by him and cannot testify about the plaintiff's state of mind or readiness and willingness, which are matters within the plaintiff's personal knowledge. •The plaintiff failed to enter the witness box and therefore failed to discharge the burden of proof. •The Court also noted that although the suit was filed within the limitation period, it was instituted only at the very end of the prescribed period despite the plaintiff having knowledge of the sale in favour of third parties. Such delay was a relevant factor while exercising the discretionary relief of specific performance. 

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance due to the defective agreement, failure to personally prove readiness and willingness, and the unexplained delay in seeking relief. 

The judgment reinforces two important principles governing suits for specific performance. First, agreements involving jointly owned property must ordinarily be executed by all persons whose interests are sought to be enforced. Secondly, the plaintiff must personally prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract, as this requirement cannot ordinarily be satisfied through the testimony of a power of attorney holder. The decision also reiterates that courts may refuse specific performance where the plaintiff approaches the court after undue delay, even if the suit is technically within the limitation period.